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Abstract. Governments and developing agencies promote participatory approaches in solving 
common pool resource problems such as in the water sector.  Two main participatory approaches 
have been applied separately, namely negotiation and mediation. In this paper we apply the Role-
Playing Game that is a component of the Companion Modeling approach—a negotiation 
procedure, and Cooperative Game Theory (Shapley value and the Nucleolus solution concepts) 
that can be mirrored as a mediated mechanism, to a water allocation problem in the Kat 
watershed in South Africa.  While the absolute results of the two approaches differ, the 
negotiation and the cooperative game theory provide similar shares of the benefit allocated to the 
players from various cooperative arrangements.  By evaluating the two approaches, the paper 
provides useful tips for future extension for both the Role-Playing Game and the Cooperative 
Game Theory applications. 
  
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4083, December 2006 
 
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange 
of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the 
presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited 
accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. 
They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they 





















































































































Common Pool Resources (CPR) are those resources to which a community rather than a private 
individual has right of access, and which are managed jointly by that community.  Examples of 
such resources, the arising conflicts, and the management arrangements among the community 
members, who may have free access, include grazing land (Goodhue and McCarthy, 2006), 
watershed resources (Anderson and Ford, 1994), fisheries (Munro, 1979), and irrigation water 
(Ostrom, 2002; Aadland and Kolpin, 2004).   
Common pool resource disputes are increasing, due to increase in competition and 
deterioration of quality. Cooperative/participatory arrangements have long been in the center of 
public interest, especially regarding the mechanisms used by communities to share and manage 
the resource. Governments and development agencies promote participatory approaches that 
allow the stakeholders to agree on the arrangements by which the common property resource is 
managed, allocated and used.  Negotiation approaches (NAs) have been used by communities as 
a cooperative mechanism to solving CPR problems (Steins and Edwards, 1999; Ostrom et al., 
1999).  In parallel, Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) that can be seen as an agreed upon 
mediated mechanism, which, among other things, explores the conditions supporting specific 
mediated solutions, has been applied with success to many CPR problems (see review of relevant 
literature by Parachino et al., 2006).   
Although the two approaches of negotiation and cooperative game theory come from 
different directions and are both based on different assumptions, they complement each other in 
that they are both based on the principles of fairness that were suggested by Carraro et al 
(2005b:39) “The perception of fairness plays a crucial role in determining how a surplus is 
divided, and the potential allocation rules must be perceived as ‘equitable’ and ‘envy-free’ by all 
parties”.  These principles of fairness together with the efficiency principle lead, under certain 
circumstances, to stable cooperative outcomes. 
  NAs focus on the resolution of conflicts originating from stakeholders’ different 
perceptions and use of natural resources. Recent literature on environmental management and 
catchment management in particular, places strong emphasis on achieving negotiated settlements 
to such conflicts (Becu et al., 2003).  In the water sector, there have been many applications of 
both NA and CGT at various levels, starting from sectoral through international (Carraro et al.,   3
2005a; Parrachino et al., 2006).  So far, the literature has applied separately NA and CGT to 
evaluate allocation issues and has not attempted comparing the NA and the CGT solutions.   
Other authors argue that participation in knowledge-sharing for water is a fundamental 
requirement for efficient and equitable use because of the cumulative effects of individual 
actions on the patterns of water use at the irrigation system and river basin scale (Lankford and 
Watson, 2006).  Although it is expected that, under certain conditions of interaction among the 
parties, NA and the CGT will lead to similar allocation solutions, there is still no clear empirical 
evidence that this is the case. 
  In this paper we apply a negotiation procedure and a CGT solution approach to a water 
allocation problem in the Kat watershed in South Africa. We use simplifying assumptions to 
allow an evaluation, based on similar parameters, of the allocation solutions.  We apply a Role-
Playing Game (RPG) that is a component of the Companion Modeling approach (Barreteau et al. 
2004), which has already demonstrated its usefulness in promoting discussion among 
stakeholders with contrasted and eventually conflicting viewpoints (Dray et al. 2006).  We then 
formulate the same allocation problem also as a CGT problem, explaining and evaluating a 
couple of allocation solutions concepts (Shapley value and the Nucleolus): these allocations in 
our case are contained in the core, which means that they enjoy a relevant stability property.  We 
explain sources for differences between the RPG and the CGT.  Although the approach is 
centered on a specific case, the general issue of stable allocation arrangements in a watershed 
that is characterized by multiple externalities is of interest to many around the world.  Therefore, 
this paper is aimed to demonstrate the application and usefulness of the Cooperative Game 
Theory and the Role Playing Game methods. 
  The next section provides a short description of the geographical, historical, political and 
institutional aspects in the Kat watershed.  Then, the water allocation issues in that watershed are 
then discussed.  The fourth section formulates the water allocation problem as a negotiation 
game and the fifth section presents the cooperative game solution to the allocation problem. 
Section 6 evaluates and explains differences, and section 7 provides possible extensions.  The 
paper is then concluded. 
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2. The Kat watershed in South Africa
1 
The Kat River valley (Figure 1), a tributary of the Great Fish River, is situated in the Eastern 
Cape province of South Africa.  Although the watershed has a relatively high rainfall, much of 
the climate of the 1,700 km
2 catchment is sub-humid to semi-arid.  The fertile valley land can be 
utilized only through irrigation, using water from the Kat River. Prior to 1969, irrigators relied 
on the natural flow in the river, but since 1969 water from the Kat Dam (a 24 million cubic 
meters (Mm
3) storage capacity) has been available. While irrigation takes up the majority of the 
water in the catchment, domestic water users (about 49,500 inhabitants in 2001) represent an 
important component in the demand for water in the catchment.  
 
Figure 1: Map of the Kat Catchment and the stylized sub-catchments in the RPG (for the 
conversion factors used see Table 1) 
 
 
Source: Left panel is based on map prepared by Alistair McMaster. (McMaster 2002). 
 
  Four groups of irrigators can be identified in the Kat Valley: small-scale black farmers, 
often forming cooperatives; large-scale ‘emerging’ black farmers
2; white commercial farmers 
with scheduled water rights; and white commercial farmers without scheduled water rights. The 
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main water related stakeholders in the Kat Valley are therefore (1) the four groups of irrigators, 
(2) domestic water users and (3) the Municipality of Nkonkombe.  The South African 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), currently operating the Kat Dam, is 
considered the fourth important stakeholder in the system. The complex and contentious political 
history of the valley has given rise to a power dynamics that historically has favored the white 
commercial farmers producing citrus who controlled water use through the Kat River Irrigation 
Board (IB).
3   
3. Water allocation issues in the Kat watershed 
Water sources in the Kat River valley are currently almost exclusively from surface water. Some 
groundwater developments are foreseen in the near future and this could increase water 
availability in the catchment by nearly 10 percent (DWAF, 2001).
4   As mentioned above, 
decisions about water allocation strategies will become the responsibility of the recently 
established Water User Association (WUA), which represents the various groups of stakeholders 
in the catchment.  
  Irrigated agriculture at present is the largest water user in the catchment, accounting for 
60% of the total water requirements, including the environmental flow requirement, the 
ecological Reserve
5 (12%).  Domestic uses (13%), afforestation (10%) and losses due to alien 
vegetation (5%) are the other requirements in the catchment. The recent history of South Africa 
led to the co-existence of different groups of irrigators in the catchment. These farmers are 
located in specific portions of the catchment
6 (Figure 1), namely smallholders and emerging 
farmers in the Upper sub-catchment (U), emerging and large-scale farmers in the Middle sub-
catchment (M) and large-scale farmers in the Lower sub-catchment (L) (Farolfi and Rowntree, 
2005).  
  Domestic water consumption per capita is low by modern standards, mainly due to 
striking rural poverty and limited services (Farolfi and Abrams, 2005).  A crucial issue for the 
National Water Resource Strategy of South Africa is the protection of environmental and 
ecological needs, which is translated into the definition and respect of the ecological reserve in 
each catchment.  Therefore, we take it as granted that the WUA that represents the water users 
respects the ecological reserve.   6
  The Kat River Dam is certainly the main tool for water supply management in the 
catchment. The dam is currently operated by DWAF based on a mechanism of water licenses and 
scheduled and non-scheduled users. It is expected that soon the WUA will be responsible for the 
management of the dam.  Therefore, in this paper we assume that it is the WUA and not DWAF 
that decides on dam water allocation.  Future demands were identified (Farolfi-Abrams, 2005) to 
include increase in citrus area; increase in small-scale irrigation schemes; increase in domestic 
uses, particularly in rural areas; more tourism, game farms and, possibly, golf courses.  These 
will be addressed in future analyses.  
4. Formulating water allocation decisions as a negotiation process 
To facilitate discussions about water allocation strategies within the Kat River WUA, 
stakeholders’ representatives accepted to take part in a process of Companion Modeling 
(Barreteau et al., 2003) consisting of an iterative and participatory development of a simulation 
model—KatAware (Farolfi and Bonté, 2005) that illustrates alternative scenarios of water 
allocation in the catchment (Farolfi and Rowntree, 2005).  
  An important component of Companion Modeling is the use of Role-Playing Games 
(RPG) to facilitate stakeholders’ comprehension of the developing model and to allow modelers 
better understanding of stakeholders’ strategies and behavior.  For this purpose, a RPG was 
constructed based on the model KatAware, which is being developed with the WUA following 
the Companion Modeling approach.  
  In the RPG, the Kat catchment (Figure 1) is divided into three sub-catchments 
corresponding to the three mentioned areas: Upper, Middle and Lower. For the purpose of this 
game, two smallholding irrigation schemes (20 ha each)
7 are located in the Upper Sub-catchment 
(U), two citrus farmers (30 ha each) are located in the Middle Sub-catchment (M) and a citrus 
farmer (40 ha) is in the Lower Sub-catchment (L).  Farmers have irrigated land on which they 
produce cabbages if they are smallholders or citrus if they are large-scale farmers.  Domestic 
water users live in three villages: one in U (3 000 inhab), one in M (5 000 inhab) and one in L 
(15 000 inhab).  An average amount of rainfall equivalent to 2 million m
3/year falls on U, whilst 
annual rainfall equivalent to 1 million m
3/year falls on the M and on L.  A dam with a storage 
capacity of 4 million m
3 is located in U.  A Water Users Association (WUA) exists in the 
catchment and is responsible for water management and allocation according to the principles of   7
Social Equity, Environmental Sustainability and Economic Efficiency as indicated in the Water 
Legislation of South Africa. All players are members of the WUA. 
  To simplify the game while reflecting its reality, data representing the actual catchment 
are transformed into values that are proportional to the real ones, and only 8 players are left to 
interact (table 1)
8.  The primary goal of the game is to allow for the available water resource of 
the catchment as a whole to be managed in a sustainable way, taking into consideration the 
above-mentioned principles.  At the same time, the goal for each player is to maximize his or her 
individual economic gain and if they are a village manager to maximize also villagers’ 
satisfaction (see additional discussion in the CGT section), within the context of the group goal.  
The game is set to allow sessions of seven simulated years. This choice is a compromise between 
playability and a time span sufficient to provide elements of discussion on mid-term 
consequences of water allocation. The RPG session presented here spans over six years. 
 
Table 1: Actual and transformed values for use in the RPG of main variables in the Kat Basin 
Variable  Actual values  Values in the RPG 
Dam Capacity (Mm
3) 24,000,000  4,000,000 
Natural runoff (Mm
3) 13,500,000  3,300,000 
Domestic consumption (Mm
3) 1,500,000  580,000 
Irrigation consumption (Mm
3) 11,000,000  1,064,000 
Cabbage area (ha)  180  40 
Citrus area (ha)  1,300  100 
Inhabitants in catchment  49,000  23,000 
Annual outflow  1,600,000  550,000 
 
  At the beginning of the game farmers receive the number of hectares corresponding to 
their farm (or irrigation scheme) and for each hectare a symbol corresponding to their production 
(cabbage or citrus).  As the game progresses, farmers also receive an amount of money 
corresponding to their previous year’s profit and a number of workers indicating how many 
permanent or seasonal employees they hired the previous season
9.  Every year farmers may 
decide to increase or reduce their irrigated area. They can also decide to change their crop   8
(cabbage to citrus or vice versa). If they decide to plant new citrus, they can choose a more 
advanced irrigation technology (drip), which would cost more but will save water.  Cabbage 
producers can decide to have 1 cycle, 2 cycles or 3 cycles of cabbage production per year on 
their fields.  Budgets and water consumption data for citrus and cabbage are provided to farmers 
at the beginning of the game.  Village managers receive, and pay for, bulk water from the WUA 
that manages the entire water in the catchment and provide water services (including water 
distribution) to the households of each village.  They start with a given ratio of water sources for 
the households of their village. These water sources are: river water; collective tap; indwelling 
tap. Each water source has a different cost (investment + operating cost) that has to be added to 
the cost of the bulk water the managers “buy” from the WUA.  Village managers can charge 
their inhabitants with a per capita tariff for the water services they provide, and this corresponds 
to their annual income.  The households derive a certain level of satisfaction (utility) from their 
income that can be spent on consumption goods. Because households have different levels of 
effort associated with the various water sources they are provided with, they also obtain different 
levels of utility from each of the three sources of water.  
  The village manager’s objective is twofold. First to maximize his or her profit resulting 
from the difference between the tariff collection and the water provision cost + bulk water cost 
and at the same time maximize the sum of households’ utility. Elements of budgets and utility 
values for households are provided to local village managers at the beginning of the game.  
  A number of factors varying annually, such as rainfall, market prices and population 
dynamics can influence players’ strategies. 
4.1 Negotiation results  
This section illustrates some outcomes of a RPG session held in the Kat catchment in November 
2005. The set-up of the game and the players participating in the session are presented in the 
right-hand side rectangle of Figure 1. The initial values characterizing each player are presented 
in the left column of Table 2, which also includes final values (end of year 6 of the negotiation 
game). In the tables that follow, year 1 is the initial state and was set by the game facilitators; 
years 2 to 6 were actually played. 
  Table 2 shows the initial and final values of the exogenous factors controlled by the game 
operators. The game facilitators introduced a general trend of increasing water scarcity. This   9
stress was produced by a combination of lower rainfall and increasing population in the 
catchment. Some marginal changes (mainly reductions) affected crop prices. A relatively low 
level of uncertainty was introduced in the session, corresponding to a small difference between 
expected (forecasted) and actual exogenous factors to which stakeholders were confronted.  
 
Table 2 – Exogenous factors in the RPG session: initial, final and Difference values. 
Variable Initial Final Difference %
Rainfall Upper (m
3) 2 ,000,000 1,400,000 -30
Rainfall Middle (m
3) 1 ,000,000 600,000 -40
Rainfall Lower (m
3) 1 ,000,000 600,000 -40
Population Upper (inhab.) 3 ,000 3,500 17
Population Middle (inhab.) 5 ,000 5,500 10
Population Lower (inhab.) 15,000 16,000 7
Market Price Citrus (R/ton) 2 ,000 2,000 0
Market Price Cabbage 6.00 5.00 -17
Note: R=Rand, the South African currency.  1 USD=6 Rand at the time of the experiment. 
 
  Clear differences in behavior and strategies among players were observed for the 
different sectors and in the three sub-catchments (Table 3 and 4).  In the U the two irrigation 
schemes opted first for an intensification of their cabbage productions (from 2 to 3 cycles per 
year). Only at the end of the RPG session the second irrigation scheme decided to reduce the 
cultivated area by 50%.  In the M, the two citrus farmers adopted two very different strategies, 
one farmer opted first towards diversification (cabbage in addition to citrus) and then abandoned 
citrus, whilst the other farmer kept the citrus area constant but also planted an equivalent area of 
cabbage.  In L, the large citrus farm adopted a quite “conservative” strategy consisting of 
reducing the planted area of citrus by 25% and not moving to cabbage.  All new citrus 
plantations in the three farms were equipped with advanced irrigation technologies, consisting of 
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Table 3: Strategies and outcomes for the 5 farms during the RPG session: initial and final values 
  Initial Final Difference (%)
Irrigation Scheme 1 (U)
Ha citrus old technology 0 0 0.0 
Ha citrus new technology 0 0 0.0 
Ha cabbage 20 20 0.0 
Cycles cabbage 2 3 50.0 
Total Ha  20 20 0.0 
Employment (n) 51 76.6 50.1 
Profit (R) 64,208 250,000 289.4 
Irrigation Scheme 2 (U)
Ha citrus old technology 0 0 0.0 
Ha citrus new technology 0 0 0.0 
Ha cabbage 20 10 -50.0 
Cycles cabbage 2 2 0.0 
Total Ha  20 10 -50.0 
Employment (n) 51 25 -51.0 
Profit (R) 64,208 250,000 289.4 
Citrus Farm 1 (M)
Ha citrus old technology 30 0 -100.0 
Ha citrus new technology 05  
Ha cabbage 0 30  
Cycles cabbage 0 1  
Total Ha  30 35 16.7 
Employment (n) 46 46 0.0 
Profit (R) 829,300 3,290,00 296.7 
Citrus Farm 2 (M)
Ha citrus old technology 30 0 -100.0 
Ha citrus new technology 03 0  
Ha cabbage 0 30  
Cycles cabbage 0 1  
Total Ha  30 60 100.0 
Employment (n) 46 84 82.6 
Profit (R) 829,300 740,000 -10.8 
Citrus Farm 3 (L)
Ha citrus old technology 40 0 -100.0 
Ha citrus new technology 03 0  
Ha cabbage 0 0 0.0 
Cycles cabbage 0 0 0.0 
Total Ha  40 30 -25.0 
Employment (n) 62 44 -29.0 
Profit (R) 1 ,105,700 2,710,00 145.1 
 
  Table 4 shows the dynamics in the village managers’ decisions regarding water services 
and tariffs for their households.  As a general trend, better water provision was introduced in all   11
villages, and this was accompanied by an increase in water tariffs required from the households. 
In some cases the increase in domestic water tariffs was perceived too high by local residents 
(village L), affecting negatively their utility. On the other hand, this water tariff increase in 
village L triggered a huge improvement in the village manager’s profit. 
 
Table 4: Strategies and outcomes for the three villages during the RPG session: initial and final 
values 
  Initial Final Difference (%) 
Village 1 (U) 
Population (Inhab.) 3 ,000 3,500 16.7 
Share of river source  0.8 0.0 -100.0 
Share of collective tap 0.2 0.2 0.0 
Share of indwelling tap 0.0 0.8  
Water tariff (R/m
3) 1 2 100.0 
Satisfaction index  40.6 41.7 2.8 
Manager's Profit (R) 20,500 420,000 1,948.8 
Village 2 (M)  
Population (Inhab.) 5 ,000 5,500 10.0 
Share of river source  0.8 0 -100.0 
Share of collective tap 0.2 0.2 0.0 
Share of indwelling tap 0 0.8  
Water tariff (R/m
3) 1 1.7 70.0 
Satisfaction index  40.6 42.89 5.7 
Manager's Profit (R) 34,180 300,000 777.7 
Village 3 (L)  
Population (Inhab.) 15,000 16,000 6.7 
Share of river source  0.1 0 -100.0 
Share of collective tap 0.4 0 -100.0 
Share of indwelling tap 0.5 1 100.0 
Water tariff (R/m
3) 1.5 2 33.3 
Satisfaction index  42.7 41.9 -1.8 
Manager's Profit (R) 128,130 2,110,000 1,546.8 
 
  It was clear that the WUA gave priority to the domestic uses of water, not hampering any 
initiative of water provision enhancement by the local managers. The respect of an ecological 
reserve set at 500,000 m
3/year in drought years and 750,000 in normal years was another WUA 
priority, due to recognition of legal requirements. Agricultural uses were more controlled and the 
release of new water licenses to farmers was less automatic, especially when the dam reserve 
became scarce (in the last three years of the RPG session).   12
  The water allocation policy by the WUA allowed positive results (profit) in terms of 
economic outputs for four farms out of five. Cabbage was more profitable than citrus due to a 
relatively steady trend in market price (excluding the final two years) and, more important, 
because no investment is required for new plantations. Farm 4 in the M sub-catchment registered 
the worst performance, paying the cost of heavy investment in new hectares planted at citrus 
combined with lower market prices in years 3 and 4. In addition, the session was too short to 
allow the farmer to recover the investment through the new citrus plants’ production (in the RPG, 
citrus takes two years after plantation to become productive).   
  Job creation was generally positive for all farms. The water shortage provoked by the 
WUA’s decision to stop releasing water in the last year had very negative impacts on job 
creation, particularly in the M and the L sub-catchments, where citrus is cultivated.   
  Table 5 shows also the dynamics of water consumption in the three sub-catchments. At 
year 1 L is the most water consuming (large village and large citrus farm) followed by M and U. 
The latter consistently increased its water consumption during years 2 to 4 due mainly to the 
intensification of cabbage production. The slight increase in water consumption in the remaining 
sub-catchments is due to higher domestic demand. At year five, water consumption in U 
decreased due to a change in strategy in one of the two irrigation schemes from three to two 
cycles of cabbage production per year. In year 6 the WUA decided to stop releasing water from 
the dam in order to allow it to refill. 
  The increasing water demand in the three sub-catchments is partially compensated by 
water releases from the dam decided by the WUA (Table 5). During the first four years of the 
game the WUA opted for the use of the Dam water to satisfy users’ water demand and to provide 
a water flow in the river able to maintain ecosystem functioning (the ecological Reserve).  
  At the end of year 5, as the Dam level reached 1.3 million cubic meters, the WUA 
decided to stop suddenly and completely water releases. This decision contributed to an 
improvement in the dam water quantity, but had an immediate and dramatic consequence on the 
socio-economic and environmental indicators in the catchment.  
   13
Table 5: Profit (R), job creation (n. of employees, rounded), water consumption (m
3) in the three 
sub-catchments; Dam level and Ecological reserve (m
3) for the whole basin 
 Year  1  2  3 4 5 6 
        





Profit U    148,924 191,235 258,121 328,450 142,437 -127,311 173,371
Profit M    1,692,874 1,089,725 332,920 1,047,169 1,196,990  -949,883  840,854 
Profit L    1,233,926  688,012 337,207 1,330,596 1,585,825  -333,844  875,872 
Total Profit  3,075,724 1,968,972 928,248 2,706,215 2,925,252  -1,411,038 1,890,097 
           
Agric. profit U  128,416 168,774  184,898 228,657  40,474  -234,938 101,819 
Agric. profit M  1,658,694 1,081,258 256,006  991,829 1,132,383  -1,038,061  785,101 
Agric. profit L  1,105,796 525,873  143,245 833,148  1,031,818  -906,511 522,400 
            
Employment U  102 140  179 191 108  102 137 
Employment M  92 119  133 142 156  130 129 
Employment L  62 76  77 84 85  44 71 
            
Annual water cons.  376,893 557,852  754,369 886,709 568,552  280,028 570,734 
Annual water cons.  464,526 612,535  657,732 800,720 843,208  564,019 657,123 
Annual water cons.  784,335  994,810 998,942 1,148,847 1,193,328  658,260  963,087 
            
Dam level    4,000,000 3,674,800 2,774,1 1,814,240 1,368,704  2,361,648 2,665,589 
            
Ecological reserve  1,700,000  1,500,000  750,000 850,000 950,000  350,000  1,016,667 
aAnnual profit values are calculated using a multiple recovery multiplier
10, calculated at 6% 
discount rate. 
 
  Table 5 allows a comparison of general socio-economic and environmental trends by sub-
catchment. Job creation is linked to the area cropped and to the intensity of production (cycles of 
cabbages on the same area); therefore, it closely follows the dynamics of water consumption. As 
a general trend, annual job creation is positive in all catchments (except for the last two years).  
Profit is more sensitive to water availability and during the first years of the game it is 
(negatively) influenced by high investments in the citrus farms.
11 This is also why the profit of M 
and L decline dramatically during the game compared with that of U, which increases. The net 
present value figures show clearly the dramatic impact of the WUA decision at year 5 on profit 
generation for the three sub-catchments. Again, M and L, where citrus farms are located, suffer 
due to the water shortage.  Annual profit values are obtained by first calculating the net present 
value of the stream of profits for each sub-catchment and then spreading it over the game   14
duration, using the capital recovery multiplier of 0.20336. A 6% discount rate, reflecting the real 
interest rate in South Africa, and 6 years are used. 
  Finally, it is worthwhile noticing that the decision to stop completely water releases from 
the dam had a negative impact also on the ecological reserve, with flow of well below the limit 
of 500,000 cubic meters at year 6. On average, the ecological reserve was kept at about 1 million 
m
3/year, corresponding to 40% less than its level at the beginning of the negotiation game 
session, but 33% more than the limit set for wet years and 100% more than the limit set for dry 
years. 
5. Formulating water allocation decisions as a cooperative game 
The Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) model will introduce several assumptions.  We assume 
that the players are rational, price takers
12  and profit maximizers.  They will engage in 
cooperative arrangements only if it can improve their economic situation compared with the 
status quo.   
The watershed includes three players (each with several water activities), Upper, Middle, 
and Lower sub-watershed—U, M, L, as is described in the right rectangle of Figure 1 (we will 
use i=1 for U, i=2 for M, and i=3 for L).  There is a water storage (dam) in the U sub-watershed, 
and an outlet of the river beyond the L sub-watershed (we will refer from hereafter only to 
watershed).  There is a deterministic rainfall quantity that falls on the area of each watershed and 
ends up in the river.  There are no losses of water and all the rainfall can be used as a source for 
the water-activities (this assumption can also be modified by having a fraction of the rainfall 
available for use, assuming losses and evaporation).  So, each player refers to the amount of 
rainfall on its area as water in the river available for use.  There are also ground water sources 
not yet fully developed, so they are not included.  Players can also use water from the reservoir 
that is released (flushed) by the WUA upon a request from the player (if supplies last).  The 
WUA can refuse to supply water from the reservoir if the amount in the reservoir is below a 
given level. 
The WUA in our game is the authority that oversees and regulates the players’ behavior.  
From the point of view of CGT, the WUA could decide on an allocation of water that respects 
principles on which it has been agreed upon (e.g., Social Equity, Environmental Sustainability 
and Economic Efficiency).  It is assumed that the players obey the WUA rules of behavior.  The   15
objective of each player is to maximize annual profits subject to water availability, prices and 
costs, and the WUA rules of behavior.   
Rules of behavior that are respected by the players are that no player extracts water that 
runs in the river that doesn’t belong to that player.  Such water include the ecological Reserve 
that flows through segments running through U, M, and L, or water that was released from the 
dam at the request of a given player and has to run in the river through the ‘territory’ of other 
players. While such behavioral requirements may look naïve in light of cheating attempts on the 
part of the users, one can include monitoring and enforcement costs associated with operating 
such system in real world situation. 
The Cooperative game played is an annual one.  Therefore, constraints for each player 
include (1) fixed citrus land, (2) limited land for cabbage, (3) fixed number of inhabitants 
consuming water, (4) given amount of rainfall that can be utilized via the flow of the river.  The 
CGT uses the values applied in the RPG.  Constraints or rules for the WUA (or at the Kat 
watershed) include: (1) a given amount of water in the storage at the beginning of the year, (2) a 
given amount of water required in the storage at the end of the year, (3) a given amount to be 
released from the Kat to the Fish river, (4) a given amount to be left in the river for local benefits, 
(5) a minimum annual amount of water per inhabitant to fulfill human needs. (6) a given amount 
of available laborers to work in citrus or cabbage operations.  It is assumed that these laborers 
can move freely between the three watersheds.  Additional assumptions represent the linkage 
between the water use and water flow in the river.  These linkages are expressed in the equations 
of the CGT game model in the Annex. 
We investigate the likelihood of cooperation among the three players, U, M, L.  CGT 
introduces the concept of the characteristic function for each set of coalitional arrangements 
among the players in the watershed.  A characteristic function is the best outcome of a coalition.  
Further assumptions are needed.  In our CGT analysis we consider a one-year game period.  The 
essential aspect of this choice is that we shall not consider investment decisions
13. This is a clear 
limitation, but we observe that in the RPG players are not in a position to make optimal 
investment decisions (especially due to the short time span allowed). Hence, the one year time 
span that we use in the CGT approach should offer an appropriate benchmark as far as evaluation 
of the RPG and CGT is considered.    16
Let us start with the status quo individual coalitions.  The status quo is represented by 
each player (watershed) working on their own to maximize their utility/profits from the available 
water they have, subject to individual constraints of each player and rule of behavior constraints 
imposed by the WUA.  There is no special treatment of the water activities and the land 
constraints.  However, in the maximization problem for each player in the case of the status quo, 
we need to add several assumptions to deal with the watershed constraints: labor, minimum 
ecological flow in the Kat River, and a given amount be released for the Fish River.
14  We will 
assume a total amount of available labor in the watershed and a total amount of environmental 
flow to be released to the Fish River.  The total available labor to each player will be based on 
the relative total available land of that player (indicating the potential employment ability of that 
player).  The allocation of the environmental flow amount will be made based on the basis of the 
total amount of water used by that player.  The minimum flow in the Kat river will be simply 
deducted from the available amount of water for each player. 
In the next step we move to the calculation of the characteristic functions of the partial 
coalitions.  We assume that all permutations are possible, even that between player 1 (U) and 
player 3 (L).  However, for these players we shall simply assume that what they can achieve in 
cooperating with each other is just the sum of what they can get separately. The difference 
between the calculation of the value of the other partial coalitions and the individual coalitions 
will be that the decision on water allocation and the total amounts of the minimum flow and the 
environmental flow can be made jointly rather than individually.  Additionally, the allocation of 
the rule values for labor, minimum flow and environmental flow will follow the pattern 
suggested in the case of the individual coalition calculations.   
And finally we move to calculate the characteristic function of the grand coalition.  In 
this case the labor constraint is at the watershed level, the minimum flow constraint is also at the 
watershed level, and the environmental flow constraint can be met at the outlet of the Kat when it 
leaves the area of Player 3 (L).   
  Let us now introduce the variables (remember that  3 , 2 , 1 = i  is equivalent to  L M U i , , = ) 
i Fα  is the (natural) available flow (with probability greater or equal than α .  In our model, α =1) 
in watershed i .   17
i S  is the stream entering watershed i ( 0 1 = S ).  
i E  is ecological reserve constraint for part i  (flow leaving part i ). Since the ecological reserve 
level that is of interest is the quantity that leaves the watershed, each watershed i  is expected to 
release to the next one, and L is expected to release to the environment that same quantity, it will 
be denoted by E.  This is another simplifying assumption, as the level of E in each watershed i  
could quite be a decision variable. 
i C : water for domestic use in part i . 
W(D) is the additional water available from the dam. 
  A player, or a coalition, will use its available water, to maximize its revenue.  Actually, 
we assume that each player solves an optimization problem to maximize the use of the available 
water via allocation among all possible water uses.  The plan that maximizes the returns is called 
the characteristic function of the coalition/player.  A very general exposition of the optimization 
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  Such an optimization problem is solved to yield solutions to the following coalitions 
(individuals, partials, and grand coalition) {U}, {M}, {L}, {U, M}, {M, L}, and {U, M, L}.  The 
solution for each coalition, the characteristic functions are denoted by: v({U}), v({M}), v({L}), 
v({U, M}), v({M, L}), and v({U, M, L}).  Note that according to our simplifying assumption 
v({U, L}) will be replaced by  v({U})+v({L}).   18
  Using various game theory solution concepts, allocations of payoffs are made among the 
three players.  We use for demonstration the Shapley Value solution concept (Shapley, 1971): 
1
11
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where c(s) is the number of coalitions of size s containing player i : 




















s c . 
  Another CGT solution concept, the Nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969), is used also (we don’t 
provide the definition of the Nucleolus; the interested reader can find it also in standard 
references, as Owen, 1995). The Nucleolus always lies in the core, provided that it is non empty. 
In our results, the values of the Nucleolus differ very little from those of the Shapley value. 
5.1 CGT solution results 
Based on our model calculations (Annex), the following are the characteristic values of the Kat 




v({U, M})=  2,341,140 
v({U, L})=  1,521,753 
v({M, L})=  2,944,639 
v({U, M, L})=  3,552,913 
  The resulting Shapley allocation is:  
= U φ      467,820.33 
= M φ    1,890,706.33 
= L φ      1,194,386.33   19
with 
}) , , ({ L M U v L M U = + + φ φ φ , since the Shapley value provides an efficient allocation, 
L M U i i v i , , }), ({ = ≥ φ , which suggest individual rationality, and 
}) , ({ M U v M U ≥ +φ φ ,  }) , ({ L U v L U ≥ +φ φ , and  }) , ({ L M v L M ≥ +φ φ   which suggests group 
rationality (otherwise stated, the Shapley value lies in the core). 
  The payoff is distributed among the three players such that U, M, and L get 13, 53 and 34 
percent of the total cooperative profits, respectively.  U is clearly the main beneficiary from the 
CGT allocation, increasing its share in the cooperative payoff by 39 percent compared with the 
non cooperation payoff, while both M and L gained 7 and 1 percent, respectively.  The CGT 
assumes utility transfer in the form of payments (or compensations). 
  For the Nucleolus, the allocation is: 465,647 for U, 1,888,533 for M, 1,198,733 for L. 
Since the core is non empty (the Shapley value, as seen, lies in it), the Nucleolus is also in the 
core.  Since the allocation provided by the Nucleolus are so close to those provided by the 
Shapley value (the differences are by far smaller than variations due to the approximations used 
or to the assumptions done), the same comments in the next section will apply for both. 
6. Evaluation of the negotiation and cooperative game theory allocations 
In this section we will attempt at evaluating the results from the RPG and the CGT allocations.  
We will review the basic features of the RPG and CGT approaches that lead to the solutions 
obtained.  We will then suggest some extensions that may be likely to bring the results of the two 
closer.  We first display the annualized allocations of profits by the RPG, The Shapley Value and 
the Nucleolus (Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Allocation of annual (and annualized) profits according to the RPG, Shapley Value and 
the Nucleolus in the Kat game. 
Player RPG  Shapley  Value  Nucleolus 
U 173,371  467,820 465,647 
M 840,854  1,890,706  1,888,533 
L 875,872  1,194,386  1,198,733 
Total 1,890,097  ≅ 3,552,913 3,552,913   20
 
  Any comparative evaluation of the NA/RPG and CGT outcomes has to be subject to 
several caveats.  First, the RPG is based on an experimental negotiation framework and the CGT 
is based on an axiomatic model.  Second, the RPG has a dynamic nature that we cannot capture 
with the present version of the CGT model.  And third, the main differences (in the RPG and the 
CGT) in the calculations of the profits of the players lead to possible discrepancies between the 
total and individual profits.  While the calculation of profits to the U, M, and L players in the 
case of the CGT are a result of an optimization process that takes into account a very strict set of 
variables, the RPG process incorporates ‘real’ players that take into consideration many more 
factors than the algorithm used in the CGT.  Just these two caveats may explain possible 
differences in total catchment outcomes.  As for the behavior of individual players, observations 
from the RPG session suggest that both irrigators and village managers aim at improving their 
respective indicators of performance (profit for irrigators; profit + residents’ satisfaction for 
village managers) without necessarily maximizing them. This might be due to a lack of 
information on the possible alternative strategies they could adopt during the RPG session and 
refers to a behavior called “satisficing”, where satisficing is an alternative to optimization for 
cases where there are multiple and competitive objectives in which one gives up the idea of 
obtaining a "best" solution (Simon, 1992). Players therefore adopt year after year strategies of 
incremental improvement of their indicators. These strategies take into account external factors 
and must be discussed within (and cleared by) the WUA before they can be put in practice. In 
addition, willingness to reach an improved state does not correspond necessarily to an improved 
state of the players all through the RPG session: lack of play skills or external factors’ dynamics 
worse than forecasted can be the causes of performances less positive than expected. 
  As can be seen from Table 6, the catchment profit (outcome) based on the RPG outcomes 
is 1.891 million Rand on an annualized basis for each of the 6 years.  The annual profit based on 
the CGT characteristic function calculations is 3.553 million.  The difference is due to economic 
decisions that are based on different algorithms and assumptions.  While the total payoff at the 
catchment level may be different in the RPG and CGT procedures, due to use of different 
assumptions, we would have a more useful insight from the distribution of the payoff among the 
players.  In our case, the three sub-catchments U, M, and L shares in the catchment total profit 
was 9, 45 and 46 percent respectively in the RPG based on the annualized allocation, and 13, 53   21
and 34 percent respectively in the CGT solution.  Note the equal share of profit for M and L in 
the RPG solution, compared with a lower share to L (compared with M) in the CGT solution.   
7. Conclusions and extensions 
This paper developed a framework that helps to evaluate CGT and RPG outcomes to a problem 
of water and outcome allocations among competing uses.  Such a framework is useful for several 
reasons.  First it allows the analysts to assess the nature of the assumptions made during the 
calculations or negotiation session.  Second it creates feedback loops between the CGT and the 
RPG to consider further development of the tools. And third, it may suggest complementary 
roles for each approach under different conditions that the parties in the allocation problem face. 
  Acknowledging the overly simplified optimizations procedure in the case of the CGT, it is 
suggested that the baseline scenario in CGT will be modified in order to address new constraints 
and scenarios that have been considered in the RPG session.  This will include the dynamic 
nature of the allocation problem, and various structures to consider the environmental flow needs.  
Future sessions of the RPG will take CGT results into consideration, such as allowing for 
negotiation among sub-catchments, and integrating the WUA to be part of the sub-catchments to 
eliminate unilateral decisions such as the one to stop releasing water from the dam. 
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Annex: The formulation of the characteristic function 
The physical model 
Denote by 
0 D  the water stock behind the dam at the beginning of the planning period.   i R  
( 3 , 2 , 1 = i ) is the amount of rainfall on the area of player i.  We interpret that variable also to be 
the amount of water available for use by player i, and also the amount of water in the river that 
player i can use.  i D  is the request for flashes of water from the dam operator by player i.  
D R1  is 
the amount of water stored behind the dam during the planning period.  As noticed, only rainfall 
in the part of the area of player 1 can be dammed.  D  will be the amount of water behind the 
dam that can be used during the planning period. 
  Several relationship hold so far: 
[1]  1 1 R R
D ≤  
[2]  ∑ ≥ + =
i
i
D D R D D 1
0  
  We further denote by  i W the total demand for water, during the planning period, by 
player i and by E  the demand (allocation) for environmental needs where the watershed ends 
and the Kat River becomes a tributary of the Fish River.  This occurs after player UL’s area. 
  Here we add several more relationships: 
[3]  i i S W ≤ ,  
Where,  i S  is the supply of water available to player i as follows: 
[4] 
D R R D S 1 1 1 1 − + =  
[5]  ) ( 1 1 2 2 2 W S R D S − + + =  
[6]  ) ( 2 2 3 3 3 W S R D S − + + = , and finally 
  We need now to include more specific relationship representing the total water demand 
by each player.  Given the water use patterns by each player, there are agricultural uses (citrus 
and cabbage), and domestic uses (in the villages and urban centers).  This amount is imposed on 
the watershed and is subject to a policy decision.   25
  For our purposes, let 
v
i V , 
u
i V , 
C
i C , and 
B
i C  be the amounts of water used by the village, 









i i C C V V W + + + =  . 
Additional constraints 
The WUA imposes minimum flow ( i MF ) to keep the river flowing in each subwatershed.  This 
minimum flow amount is deducted from each player’s amount of available water  i S . 
[8]  i i
MF
i MF S S − =  
In addition, the WUA imposes the environmental flow constraint.  We will handle that constraint 
in the following way: 
A total of EF  has to leave the Kat to the Fish river. This amount has to fulfill the following 
relationship: 
[9]  ∑ ≤
i
i EF EF  
The optimization process in each sub watershed 
The villages 
Villages. Assume that each village has a given population 
v
i N , that the annual water 
consumption per person is 
v
i v , the cost of providing each unit of water is 
v
i v P , and that the utility 
per inhabitant in the village from being provided a unit of water is 
v
i v u .  We assume that the 
utility is linear in money.  For simplicity assume that the ratio is 1:1.  The total ‘benefits’ from 





i v v v
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v






i v N V ⋅ = . 
  We introduce a constraint on the minimal amount per year that a village inhabitant should 
be receiving per year. 
[10]  v v
v
i ≥ .   26
The citrus industry 
Assume that citrus is grown with three factors of production, namely land, water and labor.  
Since we deal with a perennial crop and we assume no investment in new plantation, we will 
have the area of citrus in each sub-watershed fixed at 
C
i L .  Since in our model the area is fixed, 
the decision growers make is how much water per hectare to apply, including also no irrigation 
that end up with a minimum yield (Farolfi and Bonte, 2006). 
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i C Y  is the citrus production function.  It has a positive intercept at 
C
i C =0; 
C P  is the price 
per unit of citrus produced, which is a function of the amount of water applied per hectare, 
C
i C ; 
C
i C
i P  is the cost of water charged to the citrus operation in subwatershed i.  Note that we allow 
different water charges per crop and subwatershed; 
C
i B  is the labor per hectare of citrus; and 
B P  
is the cost per unit of labor, assuming the same for the entire Kat.   
The cabbage industry 
The cabbage industry production is very similar to that of the citrus except that, under our set of 
assumptions, the land for growing cabbage is not fixed (however, for realism we impose a 
constraint of 60 ha on the extension of land that can be used for cabbage; this constraint turns out 
to be binding only for player U and for the subcoalition {U,M}).  In the case of cabbage, the 
growers do not vary the amount of water per hectare, but decide only the area to be cultivated 













i P B P C P C L F
B
i ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ = , where 
B P  is the cost per unit of cabbage produced (cost of labor has the same symbol; 
B
i C  is the 
amount of water applied per hectare of cabbage; 
B
i C
i P  is the cost of water charged to the cabbage 
operation in subwatershed i; 
B
i B  is the labor per hectare of cabbage.  Cabbage growers decide on 
the area they plant with cabbage 
B
i L .   27
The objective function of watershed i 
Watershed i maximizes payoff from the three activities, subject to physical and institutional 
constraints: 





ii ii UUF F +++ , i=1, 2, 3 
        . .t s  the relevant constraints in [1]-[10] 
The characteristic functions 
The characteristic function of the individual coalitions are actually a solution to an LP problems 
that are based on the coalition at stake.  In the case of the individual coalitions we solve [12] 
subject to relevant constraints in [1]-[10], and imposed rules of allocation of water from the Dam, 
Allocation of the minimum flow and allocation of the environmental flow among players 1, 2, 3. 
  Then we have the possibility of subcoalitions.  Clearly a coalition of {1, 2} and a 
coalition of {2, 3} can be envisioned.  As said, a coalition of {1, 3} is less obvious.  We can 
include such coalition on the premise that the WUA enforces rules and water transfers that are 
respected by its members.   28
Notes 
                                                 
1 Modified from Farolfi and Rowntree (2005). 
2 “Emerging” citrus farmers are black farmers that after 1994 had the right to exploit (and not own) citrus farms 
located during Apartheid period in the Ciskei Bantustan and previously owned and managed by the public 
Bantustan’s administration.  
3 The IB was substituted lately by a more participatory Water User Association (WUA) including representatives of 
all main groups of stakeholders in the Kat. This organization is now in charge of defining the water “business plan” 
indicating water allocation strategies and resource management for the catchment.  While the difference between the 
IB and WUA may not be essential for the CGT, it is very important for the negotiation process, as will be discussed 
later. 
4 Developing groundwater resources in the watershed would help irrigators overcome droughts.  However, in this 
paper GW development is not considered due to need for external financial support. 
5 Defined in the National Water Act as “the quantity and quality of water required to protect the aquatic ecosystems 
of the water resource in order to secure ecologically sustainable development and use of the resource.” 
6 These portions of the catchment correspond to the three voting areas identified to nominate the Kat River Valley 
Water Users Association representatives (Figure 1). 
7 ha=hectare.  1 ha=2.5 acre. 
8 The conversion factors for the different variables range between 2.1 (Inhabitants in catchment) and 13 (Area citrus). 
The arbitrary choice of the conversion factors was due to the trade-off between having an RPG that represents the 
reality and an RPG that is “playable”.  It may be noticed that players validated the RPG representation of the Kat 
during the first session. The only criticism was for the disproportionately high importance of domestic water 
consumption in the RPG compared to the real one. This issue was addressed in a second version of the RPG by 
changing the conversion factor of “Inhabitants in catchment” from 2.1 to 4.9. 
9 For production and profit functions used in the KatAware model that supports the RPG, see the characteristic 
functions used also for the CGT model. 
10 The Capital Recovery Multiplier equation used is  ] 1 ) 1 /[( ] ) 1 ( [ − + + ⋅
t t r r r , where r  is discount rate (0.06), 
and t  is number of years of the game ( 6 = t ). 
11 In this game, profit=total income-total costs. If a farmer invests in citrus plantations, therefore, his annual income 
during the first years of new orchards is constant (no production) whilst the costs increase. It was noticed by citrus 
farmers during the game debriefing that this is not really how they see things because an investment is calculated as 
a positive asset in their budget, whereas here is a negative (cost) one. They suggested calling “cash-flow” what we 
call “profit” in the game outcomes. 
12 Face given prices rather than affecting the prices in the market. 
13 We should stress that the formulation of our CGT problem allows considering longer time horizons by creating 
for each player and coalitions optimization problems that span over T years but what the player considers is the 
expected annualized value. 
14 We assume that the ecological reserve serves both for environmental health in the Kat River and for releases into 
the Fish River’s estuary. 
15 A multi-year problem will be developed in our future work. 